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At the height of the COVID-19 crisis in the Netherlands a shortness of intensive care beds was looming. Dutch
professional medical organizations asked a group of ethicists for assistance in drafting guidelines and criteria for
selection of patients for intensive care (IC) treatment in case of absolute scarcity, when medical selection criteria
would no longer suffice. This article describes the Dutch context, the process of drafting the advice and reflects on
the role of ethicists and lessons learned. We argue that timely interaction between clinical and ethical expertise is
necessary since the distinction between medical and non-medical considerations is not as clearcut as sometimes
assumed. Furthermore, pragmatic considerations related to the specifics of an epidemic are of importance, for
example, in relation to prioritizing health care workers. As a consequence, any protocol already present before the
pandemic would need alterations to fit the current situation. The ‘fair innings’ criterion we proposed, rephrased as
an argument of intergenerational solidarity, was considered reasonable by professionals as well as patient
organizations. While it is desirable to draft ethical guidelines in ‘peacetime’ as a matter of pandemic preparedness,
the pressure of an actual crisis facilitates decision-making, although it will also complicate a more democratic
approach.
Introduction
The COVID-19 epidemic reached the Netherlands in the
beginning of March 2020. Notwithstanding initial social
distancing measures, the number of COVID-19 patients
increased steadily, and within weeks hospitals in certain
regions were overwhelmed. A quickly established na-
tional coordination structure to relocate and distribute
patients could not prevent that shortness of intensive
care units (ICUs) was looming. It was hoped that a quick
expansion (as far as reasonably possible) of critical care
capacity and more strict patient selection based on med-
ical criteria would be sufficient to deal with the increased
demand. Yet, how to deal with a situation where
physicians would find themselves unable to treat all
patients who required intensive care to survive?
In the Netherlands, as in other countries, no ready-to-
use protocols were available at the start of the outbreak
(Antommaria et al., 2020). The Dutch Association of
Medical Specialists (FMS) felt they needed help to
come up with fair guidelines for this non-medical triage.
They asked the Royal Dutch Medical Association
(KNMG) for assistance, and the KNMG invited five eth-
icists—the authors of this article—to help draft such
guidelines. Four of us also have a medical background
(MS and SvdV majored in medicine, DW has been a
general practitioner and MdV is a pediatrician); the fifth
(MV) is well versed in public health.
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In this article, we describe the Dutch context, the pro-
cess of drafting the advice and the final result. We focus
on some controversies, notably our own role during the
process and indicate some lessons learned.
The Dutch Context
Even though official numbers of ICU capacity need to be
treated with caution because not every country uses the
same definitions, it is clear that the Netherlands have a
low capacity compared to other European countries: 6.4
beds per 100,000 inhabitants. As shown in Figure 1, the
average number in European countries is 11.5 beds;
Germany has around 30, Luxemburg 25, Belgium ap-
proximately 15 and France 11.5 (Rhodes et al., 2012).
In normal circumstances this low number appears
sufficient and ICU scarcity in the Netherlands is rare.
The Dutch health care system has a relatively strong
focus on efficiency, and maintaining a high surplus cap-
acity in intensive care departments involves major
investments that could also be used in other health
care domains. Moreover, it might be that Dutch physi-
cians are more reluctant than their colleagues in other
countries to send patients to intensive care. Dutch doc-
tors see ICU treatment as an invasive and sometimes
harmful treatment that imposes severe burdens on
patients—also in the long run—that should only be
offered to patients who have a reasonable prospect to
benefit (Fogteloo, 2020). Moreover, death on ICU is
not seen as a good death, but as something that should
be avoided, and this may also play a role in discussions
with patient and family when further treatment options
are considered (Abarshi et al., 2009). Costs are not an
issue for individual treatment decisions; in the
Netherlands medically necessary care is covered by the
(obligatory) health insurance for all inhabitants.
Figure 1. Numbers of critical care beds corrected for size of population (per 100,000 inhabitants) for European countries (Rhodes
et al., 2012).
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Soon after the start of the COVID-19 epidemic it be-
came clear that the Dutch capacity would not be suffi-
cient to treat all patients who would be needing an ICU
bed.
A centralized system was set up to distribute patients
over hospitals in the country, so that regions with a low
incidence would share the burdens of more affected
regions. Furthermore, hospitals succeeded in doubling
the ICU capacity within a few weeks, shifting much cap-
acity and resources from regular care to intensive care.
This resulted in a capacity of 13 ICU beds per 100,000
inhabitants—a major achievement but still far below the
normal capacity in countries such as Luxemburg and
Germany. ICU doctors and nurses made clear that a fur-
ther expansion was impossible due to lack of qualified
staff. At that point, the situation that not all eligible
patients could be served became a terrible, but realistic
prospect.
As a first step toward stricter triage protocols, Dutch
Society of Intensive Care (NVIC) formulated various
levels of increasingly strict medical criteria for patients
to be admitted to the ICU (NVIC (Nederlandse
Vereniging voor Intensive Care), 2020). Exclusion cri-
teria were formulated in line with the CHEST Consensus
Statement (Christian et al., 2014), based on low prob-
ability of survival and short life expectancy, such as ‘se-
vere trauma with expected >90% mortality rate’, or
‘end-stage organ failure with life expectancy <1 year’.
However, the possibility remained that even those
stricter criteria would not be sufficient to allocate the
scarce resources and it was expected that a next step
involved patient selection on the basis of criteria that
would be arbitrary from a medical point of view. At
that point in time we were asked to offer further
guidance.
Process
The KNMG organized a first videoconference in which
they explained the problem and gave insight into the
existing (medical) protocols and the stepwise approach
to increasingly strict medical triage. They stressed the
need for speedy work, since the situation was worsening
quickly.
An initial in-depth discussion of possible criteria and
subsequent email exchange led to a first version of our
ethical advice on triage guidelines within 2 days. This
draft was sent to representatives of the ethics depart-
ments of each of the eight Dutch medical schools.
They were given 24 hours to comment on the draft and
most responded within that time frame. The draft
received general support and after a few adjustments a
second draft was discussed with representatives of the
FMS. Their feedback resulted in further adaptations and
within a week after the first meeting our ethical advice
together with a first draft of a guideline for ‘triage on
non-medical grounds’ written by the FMS and the eth-
icists of KNMG based on our advice, was sent to the
Dutch Health Inspectorate. The Inspectorate has a legal
role in maintaining quality of care and the FMS felt that
the Inspectorate’s support was essential to ascertain that
physicians would not have to fear litigation if they actu-
ally did perform triage on non-medical grounds. The
Inspectorate wanted information on the views of societal
stakeholders and therefore asked the KNMG to consult
with a number of societal parties (associations of elderly,
patient associations and other professional organiza-
tions). Interestingly, the consultations conducted with
the KNMG did not give rise to major critique, so no
significant adaptations appeared necessary.
Simultaneously, the guideline was brought on par with
various other medical guidelines dealing with triage in
other settings (nursing homes, ER, etc.) and several
weeks after the first videoconference, the draft protocol
was offered to the Inspectorate and sometime later also
to the Dutch Minister of Health.
The Advice
One thing was clear in the discussions from the outset:
we were to offer guidance for a scenario that everyone
abhorred and wanted to avoid by all means. Triage on
non-medical grounds would be a true tragedy since it
implied that patients who could potentially benefit from
ICU treatment were to be denied this treatment. Ethical
guidance at best could aim at helping physicians to make
the ‘least worst’ decisions. Any set of criteria we would
propose would involve some degree of contingency and
it was also clear that at some point no substantive
grounds for allocation might be available and that then
the fairest approach would be to defer to a randomized
procedure for allocating beds, i.e. a lottery. But before
that, in our view, it was possible to come with some more
substantive guidance for triage decisions. We agreed on
several basic ethical notions (Table 1).
The most fundamental notion was that all human
beings have equal worth, which we considered a basis
for holding that many personal features should be irrele-
vant for triage decisions, such as ethnicity, gender, social
or legal status or wealth. Moreover, we rejected selection
based on mental and physical impairment and (prior)
quality of life indices, from the principle that every
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human being has equal moral worth and every life is
worth saving. Medical criteria like the clinical frailty
score (CFS) (De Geer et al., 2020; Guidet et al., 2020),
had already been used as a factor to determine probabil-
ity of survival in earlier selection steps, implying there
would be no remaining relevant medical grounds for
triage on the basis of impairments at this stage. At that
point, experienced quality of life is irrelevant. We also
considered judgments about ‘personal responsibility for
illness’ or ‘own fault’ to be irrelevant for ICU admission,
both for principled reasons (people should not have to
pay in this way for what went wrong in their lives) and
for practical reasons: it would be impossible, in the hectic
situation of an outbreak, to determine ‘guilt’ in any fair
way.
We were reluctant to prioritize health workers because
one of the main arguments—the utilitarian consider-
ation that serving health care workers first might enable
them to continue their life-saving work—seemed rather
irrelevant for ICU settings in the COVID-19 crisis. Once
in need of ICU treatment, a patient needs months to
recover from COVID-19 and is not expected to return
to work in the short term. Eventually we did suggest
some form of prioritization of people working in health
care; not for reasons of utility but as a matter of desert
given the increased and sometimes unavoidable expos-
ure to the virus in their professional (life-saving) work.
This consideration would be particularly relevant if these
health care workers (including cleaning and transport
personnel) did not have sufficient personal protection.
We also agreed on the basic idea of fair innings that
younger persons have a stronger claim to life-saving
interventions, but gave it the specific form as explained
below. Finally, the criteria we proposed should not be
used to compare patients already admitted to patients
waiting for intensive care, although we did leave room
for reevaluating the prospects of patients in ICU, which
might lead to withdrawal of intensive care for medical
reasons.
Our final advice is summarized in Table 2.
Evaluation
There has been much discussion in past decades, as well
as during the current COVID-19 crisis about the justifi-
cation of triage criteria (Truog et al., 2006; Verweij, 2009;
Kirby, 2010; Kaposy and Khraishi, 2012; Emanuel et al.,
2020). A reasonable justification has both substantive
(are there morally relevant grounds for selecting
patients?) as well as procedural (what is a fair process
to come to a triage protocol?) elements. In pluralist soci-
eties chances are high that we will disagree about prin-
ciples that should govern rationing (Daniels, 2000)
although there are various ways to find overlap and di-
vergence between different normative approaches
(Verweij, 2009). In this article, we reflect on the process
toward a triage protocol, specifically on our own role in
it and on what we have learned. We elaborate on six
points.
Should Medical Ethics Offer ‘Fair’ Guidance That
Tidies Up Questionable Political Choices from
the Past?
Some of our colleagues thought this was an example of
‘wheeling in the ethicist’ for problems that should not
have occurred in the first place. In the Netherlands there
is much emphasis on efficiency in health care and, as a
result of that, the ICU capacity is simply too small to
cope with extreme circumstances. If this was a matter of
too much efficiency-thinking and insufficient political
foresight, should ethicists lend themselves to tidy things
up?
Table 1. Basic ethical notions as endorsed in the guideline
Basic ethical notions for triage
• Every human being has equal moral worth
• A justified objective of ICU triage is to save as many lives as possible
• Mental or physical impairments, social or legal status, wealth, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and personal
relationships are irrelevant.
• Considerations about responsibility for getting ill (e.g. risk behavior) are irrelevant as well.
• Age is relevant as a matter of priority for the worst off: if not all lives can be saved, persons who are relatively young
are worse off than those who have lived a large part of a normal lifespan (fair innings).
• Triage criteria for admittance to the ICU should apply equally to COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 patients
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We agree that pandemic preparedness—and especial-
ly its ethical implications—could have been better, and
we elaborate on that below. We do not agree with the
assumption that bioethicists should not offer guidance
in dilemmas that are the result of questionable policy
choices from the past. Many ethical dilemmas can be
avoided if timely action or precaution is taken or if
more investments have been made; but that is not a rea-
son to forego an advisory role when the dilemma does
occur. Moreover, depending on the severity of the crisis,
excessive scarcity could even occur in countries that were
better prepared in terms of their ICU capacity, like
Germany. Leaving it to doctors to ‘clear the rubbish’
and declining their request for ethical advice, would in
our opinion not have been right.
For that matter, the assumption that in normal times
there is insufficient over-capacity in the Netherlands—
can also not be embraced without further analysis.
Maintaining extra ICU capacity in normal times has op-
portunity costs and may well lead to other shortages
elsewhere in the health care system.
Should Ethical Deliberation about Triage Criteria
Not Be Part of Pandemic Preparedness to Avoid
the (Ad Hoc) Pressures during a Crisis?
Another criticism raised by others as well as by ourselves
concerns timing. Ideally, one would think, such contro-
versial policies are not developed in the heat of a crisis
but as a matter of pandemic preparedness. This would
have many advantages: there is less time pressure, it may
be easier to involve different stakeholders and politi-
cians, and, given the lack of knowledge about the nature
of the next pandemic and who will be at highest risk,
deliberation can be more impartial as it occurs behind a
‘veil of ignorance’; not always the elderly are the highest
risk group; the Spanish Flu, for example, especially hit
hard among young adults. Moreover, it was put forward
that public discussions about strict triage would cause
additional anxiety among the most vulnerable groups
(for COVID-19: elderly, chronically ill patients, persons
with obesity).
In 2012, 3 years after the H1N1-pandemic, a Dutch
bioethics think tank had issued a report outlining the
most important ethical issues and possibilities with the
urgent advice to the Minister of Health not to postpone
these discussions until a new epidemic came along (CEG
Centrum voor Ethiek en Gezondheid, 2012).
Unfortunately, this was exactly what happened: the re-
port sank into oblivion only to resurface when COVID-
19 appeared.
Interestingly, during the process we started to see the
benefits of ethical deliberation during crisis. We met
much more consensus and support for controversial
arguments and concrete proposals than we had
expected. The assumption that it would be easier to agree
on allocation principles in peacetime, when no immedi-
ate interests are threatened, thus might not be the whole
truth. Moreover, one can question the legitimacy of such
general principles that are meant to guide choices in a
crisis, if stakeholders have limited foresight of what the
principles will actually imply in an actual crisis.
Table 2. Final guidance on COVID-19 pandemic ICU triage
Final advice
• First step is to prioritize patients who are expected to require intensive care for only a relatively short period.
• Health care workers get prioritized but only if, as part of their work, they have had multiple and risky contacts
which patients, exposing them to the COVID-19 virus, while they had insufficient access to personal protection
materials due to national or regional shortage.
• Age is a relevant criterion as a matter of intergenerational solidarity. On the basis of their age, people are classified as
belonging to a generation, with younger generations receiving higher priority than older generations. Generations
were defined as age groups: 0–20, 21–40, 41–60, 61–80 and 81þ.
• Patients who are already on the ICU should not be compared to patients who still need to be admitted; hence,
treatment may not be withdrawn based on such comparisons. Withdrawing ICU treatment is, however, acceptable
when it is estimated that the individual patient (not in comparison to others) has insufficient perspectives on
recovery in the foreseeable future. The medical criteria that inform this estimation (including the definition of
‘foreseeable future’) may become stricter when the pressure on the ICU continues to increase.
• If the above criteria are inconclusive: a procedure based on chance is justified, either a lottery or ‘first come, first
serve’
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Finally, every epidemic or other disaster will be un-
predictable to some extent, raising unpredictable ethical
issues. For example, prioritizing health care staff is usu-
ally justified by their usefulness in combatting the disas-
ter—in this case, however, duration of ICU admission
and rehabilitation are so long, that this argument failed.
Of course, bioethical reflection in pandemic pre-
paredness planning is of high importance, and the eth-
ical reports and literature we had at our disposal proved
highly useful for our deliberation. Our experiences,
however, show that tailored ethical guidance must and
can be made in the heat of a crisis.
Should One Accept Primacy of Medical
Considerations for Triage Decisions?
There is yet another aspect to timing that requires critical
reflection. We were asked to offer ethical guidance for
triage decisions in case all (evidence-based) medical
grounds for triage would have been exhausted. In fact,
the NVIC had already written and updated a pandemic
triage protocol in which infrastructure and medical tri-
age criteria were formulated. We were called in when the
doctors thought they would soon be at the end of their
wits—not before. This conveys a view on triage decision-
making in which ethical expertise has no place as long as
medical criteria can still play a role in patient selection.
This assumption is deeply problematic for several
reasons.
First of all, it suggests a relatively clear distinction be-
tween situations where medical decisions can be all
evidence-based, and situations where medical evidence
offers insufficient ground for further patient selection.
Arguably, this distinction is seldom clear cut.
Second, and much more fundamental, it suggests that
medical criteria are relatively uncontroversial or even
morally neutral (or at least beyond moral doubt) and
that value judgments and ethical reasoning especially
become relevant when strictly medical judgments are
exhausted. This assumption does not hold given that
medicine is a deeply value-laden practice anyway. But
in case medical practice is approaching excessive scarcity
and triage becomes necessary—even triage on still purely
medical grounds—medicine itself adopts a different
normative framework. Indeed, the (strictly medical)
protocol of the NVIC emphasized that it offered a road-
map from focusing on optimal care for each individual
patient to optimal medical care for the population as a
whole. This is a controversial value-laden judgment in-
deed, in which ethical guidance seems appropriate.
Moreover, saving most lives is only one of several pos-
sible ways to give substance to optimal medical care for
the population—one could also aim to protect as many
life years as possible, or include quality and not just
quantity of life. Although we think saving most lives is
a reasonable interpretation of efficiency in this context,
this is not a self-evident ethical choice (Verweij, 2009).
Moreover, by giving primacy to medical considera-
tions in order to save most lives, a particular position
is taken in the fair-chances/best outcomes tradeoff
(Daniels, 1993). Applying strictly medical criteria in tri-
age decisions to attain optimal effects may imply that
some groups lose all prospect to possible life-saving
treatment. This can be considered inequitable: after all,
if one belongs to a high-risk group in which it will be
more difficult to be treated effectively, it does not imply
that one would have no chance to benefit from intensive
care at all. A full focus on medical grounds for efficient
use of resources even runs the risk to broaden health
inequalities and social injustices, given that determi-
nants of ill-health and risk factors often cluster in groups
that are socially deprived. Indeed, in the USA the
COVID-19 pandemic shows a higher mortality among
African-American men (Garg et al., 2020).
Although we acknowledge there was a risk that our
‘late arrival’ legitimized a primacy of purely medical
considerations focusing on ‘best outcomes’, we suc-
ceeded in changing some earlier decisions on medical
criteria. We helped to discard the idea to use age (e.g.
>80 or even>70) as an absolute exclusion criterion, and
we managed to ascertain that the CFS would not be used
for non-elderly persons, as this might lead to undue dis-
crimination of persons with preexisting mental or phys-
ical impairments.
Fair Innings or Discrimination of the Elderly?
Another lesson is the way we felt we had to reframe the
‘fair innings’ argument. Inspired by the Maryland
community-based triage policy (Biddison et al., 2019),
we argued that age as such should not be a criterion, but a
large enough difference in age between patients who
might benefit should. In our view, using the terminology
of ‘generations’ captured this best, as it can be used to
appeal to intergenerational solidarity. Indeed, during the
first weeks of the outbreak, many elderly citizens stated
that they would be prepared to give up their claim to an
ICU bed if that could save the life of a younger person. At
the same time, the mere mentioning of ‘age’ as a possible
criterium also led to public and political agitation and
accusations of age discrimination. However, during the
consultation round with, among others, various patient
groups and elderly citizens, it appeared that the ‘gener-
ations’ argument was well-received and thought
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justifiable, once properly explained and openly discussed
amongst their constituency.
The Importance of Practicality
As mentioned above, it was the first time in the recent
history of our country that these issues had to be dis-
cussed under the actual threat of absolute scarcity. Our
advice therefore had be concrete and feasible. Earlier
deliberations, such as the 2012 report mentioned above,
had offered general considerations at best, but no clear
practical steps to be followed (CEG Centrum voor Ethiek
en Gezondheid, 2012). During our deliberations with
physicians, every step in the protocol was related to the
actual practice, including the concrete infrastructure
and distribution of the ICU care in the Netherlands.
This had some unexpected consequences.
For example, we stipulated that in a situation of ab-
solute shortage, there should be no priority for pandemic
victims over regular patients. The same non-medical
criteria would have to apply to COVID-19 and non-
COVID-19 patients alike. However, in practice there
are COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 ICU units that
face different levels of scarcity, so at one moment in
time different criteria might apply to COVID-19 and
non-COVID-19 patients. In order to treat those two
groups as equal as possible, enough—but not too
many—ICU beds should be reserved for non-COVID
patients.
The specific features of this epidemic, especially the
long admissions and protracted recovery after ICU, led
to another new element: the usual argumentation about
priority for health care workers and other so-called es-
sential professions could no longer be based on their
usefulness in fighting the consequences of the pandemic.
Such priority could only be justified by appeal to the fact
that health care workers had faced higher personal risks,
in their work for the benefit of all patients. While health
care workers do not run a bigger risk than many others as
long as they are well-protected, the shortages of protect-
ive materials in the current crisis made a difference here.
We argued that therefore only priority should be given to
health care workers with frequent COVID-19 patient
contacts and who had insufficient access—due to scar-
city—to personal protection materials.
Should These Decisions Not Be Made in a Public
Sphere and in a Democratic Process?
A triage protocol should not only be based on reasonable
principles suggested by bioethicists but ideally also be
the outcome of a politically legitimate process
(Daniels, 2000). Our hope was that for that reason final
decision regarding triage criteria in absolute scarcity
would receive political support. In our advisory role
we consistently argued that a final protocol would
need to be endorsed by government to ascertain political
legitimacy and democratic accountability, but we real-
ized that this would be an almost impossible problem for
politicians to take a stance on. For that reason, the con-
sultation of various societal groups, as instigated by the
health inspectorate and carried out by the KNMG, was
especially worthwhile and we consider it as contributing
to the legitimacy of the process.
In practice, attempts to get support from the
Inspectorate and the Minister of Health led to a post-
ponement of publication of the protocol of more than a
month. At the beginning of the pandemic the complete
parliament had supported a motion that ruled out triage
on the basis of absolute age limits. Also after several
discussions and negotiations, the Minister of Health
remained critical of the protocol’s reference to age as a
relevant consideration. Notwithstanding his view, mid-
June 2020, the medical associations KNMG and FMS
published the protocol, establishing its status as a valid
professional guideline. The Inspectorate has called for a
professional and social debate about the protocol, in
order to consider decisions in line with it as satisfying
standards of ‘good medical practice’ during times of a
crisis. The medical associations see the current publica-
tion also as open for a societal debate that might lead to
adjustments in the future. The publication received a
relatively favorable coverage in newspapers and other
media, as a first step in this debate.
Conclusion
Looking back on the process of drafting the triage guide-
lines, we can conclude several things. First, timely inter-
action between clinical and ethical expertise is necessary.
This could and should have happened earlier. Medical
grounds and ethical grounds for triage should not be
separated, and this is illustrated by our experience with
the process of alignment between the medical and non-
medical guidelines. We were able to make some differ-
ence and offer guidance in the medical guidelines. By
giving our advice and discussing it with representatives
of the medical associations we helped to prevent an ex-
clusion criterion in terms of absolute age that the doctors
were considering, and we managed to assure that the CFS
would not be used for non-elderly persons. Second, we
feared that the predominant susceptibility of the elderly
for COVID-19 would make fair innings especially
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controversial. However, there was a lot of support for the
intergenerational solidarity argument and the related
relative age criterion even from representatives of elderly
associations.
Third, writing advice with this immense impact needs
the (ad hoc) pressure during a crisis to come up with
concrete, practicable, clear and unambiguous criteria
to allow for procedurally just triage in the whole country.
Without this pressure it is hard to believe that the painful
choices that had to be made, would actually be made.
Nor could the criteria have been geared to the specifics of
this unique situation. While this illustrates that ‘peace-
time’ ethical deliberations may not be best suited to ar-
rive at such guidelines, the urgency and political
sensitivity of the subject in the middle of a crisis com-
plicates public democratic decision-making and hence
raises questions of legitimacy.
During the discussions about the protocol, the threat
of absolute scarcity gradually lessened. In fact, the horror
scenario of triage on non-medical grounds has only been
nearby in the south of the Netherlands, while the pres-
sure in other parts of the country was still limited. On a
national level, at most 3=4 of the maximally expandable
ICU capacity was in use during the peak of the crisis.
Openly debating the protocol in society and parliament
seemed less and less urgent and we feared that in the end
the protocol would not be published at all. The medical
associations, however, were determined to publish it as a
professional guideline.
In the coming months political and societal debates will
continue and this might result in adjustments, or a com-
pletely different protocol in the future. For now, however,
there is a protocol in place that does offer guidance in a
possible next wave in the pandemic. At the same time, the
prospect that the protocol might become practice in the
future is abhorred by proponents and opponents alike.
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